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Manipulating the annual account numbers can benefit every company, and lots of techniques 
are available to reach this aim. In Belgium, empirical data concerning the phenomenon of 
earnings management is rather rare, and perhaps the last “non-believers” have been 
convinced of its existence by the scandals around Lernout & Hauspie. Anyhow, one recent 
study (Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003) found that 39 listed Belgian companies do engage in 
income smoothing and manage earnings opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of 
prior-year earnings. In this paper, we examine whether the Belgian companies manage their 
earnings by focusing on their policy of provisions during the period 1997 - 2002. Concerning 
the technique of income smoothing, some proof has been found that companies engage in 
income smoothing by increasing or decreasing the provisions. What big bath accounting is 
concerned, no proof has been found, since companies do not seem to grant more donations to 
provisions in times of a declining profit figure.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Companies have different reasons to present their numbers better (or worse). Some of the 
reasons for the creative approach of the figures are its impact on the value of the stocks, its 
impact on the borrowing costs, its impact on bonus plans, and its impact on political costs 
(Comiskey and Mulford, 2002). Depending on the economic situation of the company, there 
may be other motives, such as labor union contract negotiations and proxy contests, amongst 
others. So when taking decisions based on the annual report, it can be important to see in 
which situation the company finds itself, and therefore could have motives to manipulate the 
figures. 
 
Different possibilities are available for accountants to manipulate the figures within the 
boundaries of the accounting law, so as to manage results at will (Amat et al., 1999). So the 
choice of a certain policy, as for instance the method of depreciation, can steer the figures in 
the desired direction. Also the fact that some of the balance sheet items are vulnerable to a 
certain measure of estimation and appreciation makes manipulation possible. Another 
possibility stems from the freedom the companies have concerning the time to perform certain 
transactions. Finally, the company can influence the numbers with the help of artificial 
transactions, as for instance the sale-and-lease-back policy. 
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There are various techniques for managing the results, however the two most known and 
popular ones are “income smoothing” and “big bath accounting”. With income smoothing, the 
management diminishes the fluctuations in the results, so as to obtain a more stable evolution 
over time. Big bath accounting is used by the accountants when the results are bad. The 
principle is that if a loss is made, it is better to enter some more costs so as to restart with a 
clean slate the following year. The “fiscal optimalisation” tries to diminish or to shift the 
taxable base by influencing the reported results. Further the accountant can strive to match the 
results of the former years (“results fixing”) or just try to eliminate the losses (“loss 
diversion”). 
 
So management has lots of reasons, as well as lots of opportunities and techniques, to 
manipulate the figures. It is not surprising that the phenomenon of creative accounting is a 
much-examined field in the international literature. Hereby, use is often made of the term 
“earnings management”, so as to avoid the negative sound of the term “manipulation”. In this 
paper, we surely do not want to zoom into the many publications, so the interested reader is 
referred to Healy and Wahlen (1999), Stolowy and Breton (2000), Vander Bauwhede et al. 
(2003), amongst others.  
 
In spite of the interest, only few studies have been performed concerning creative accounting 
in Belgium. In 1998, De Rijcke (1998) looked at 1 000 Belgian production companies to 
examine whether inventories, work-in-process and depreciations were used as techniques of 
earnings management. Results showed that inventories were used for (zero) results fixing, 
whilst the depreciation on these inventories was used to keep profits down when this variable 
increased. Also, for 118 big companies of the industrial industry, it was examined whether 
exceptional results, salaries and social charges were used as techniques for income smoothing. 
No proof for this phenomenon could be found. The only finding was that companies with a 
higher profitability are more concerned with income smoothing. 
 
Somewhat contradictory with this general conclusion that Belgian companies are not really 
engaged with the phenomenon of earnings management, were the results of Vander 
Bauwhede et al. (2003). They tested the hypothesis whether Belgian companies engage in 
income smoothing and manage earnings opportunistically to meet the benchmark target of 
prior-year earnings. Concentrating on 39 companies, support for the hypothesis was found. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether Belgian companies do manage their earnings 
by their policy of provisions. We assume that Belgian companies avoid large variability in 
reported income numbers, because of different reasons (Vander Bauwhede et al., 2003). By 
reporting stability in the reported earnings, the company can influence stakeholders’ 
perception of the stability of the underlying economic earnings, and thus their assessment of 
the probability of bankruptcy of a firm. This might influence the terms of trade of a company 
with its various stakeholder groups such as customers, suppliers, short-term creditors and 
employees (all being important users of financial reporting in Belgium). Besides the 
engagement in income smoothing, we also examine the existence of big bath accounting.  
 
Since all companies that meet certain legal form and size criteria are mandated to file 
financial statements with the Belgian National Bank, we include in our sample publicly as 
well as privately held companies. More particularly, we focus on all companies filing an 
individual annual report according to the complete scheme. Given the focus on the individual 
accounts, we also expect taxes to have a direct impact on accounting choices, and in 
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particular, earnings management. The reason is that Belgian companies only submit one set of 
individual accounts for both financial reporting and tax purposes.  
 
 
2. The use of provisions by Belgian companies 
 
One of the balance sheet items that can be used by the company as a means for earnings 
management is the item of “provisions”. According to the Belgian accounting law, the 
“Provisions for risks and costs” intend to cover by their nature clearly defined losses and 
costs, which are likely or certain on the balance sheet date, but have no fixed amount. 
 
Provisions make no part of real transactions, but are seen as the administrative assimilation of 
these transactions. This assimilation is based on the systems of measurement and income 
determination, which can be chosen and changed. Further, these include the estimates that are 
needed to come to a result. It is clear that a company has more latitude here than in real 
transactions, since administrative transactions are dependent of all subjective factors. 
 
Before examining whether the provisions are used as a tool for earnings management, it might 
be interesting to give an overview of the use and the importance of this balance sheet item. 
For this overview, we focus on all those Belgian companies who filed an annual report 
according to the complete scheme during the period 1997-2002. All together, it concerns a 
sample consisting of 10 418 companies. Data can be obtained by the Belfirst, being a database 
that contains the financial statement data of all Belgian companies that are legally required to 
file financial statements with the Belgian National Bank.  
 
In Belgium, it is legally prescribed to split up the “Provisions for risks and costs” into four 
categories, so as to increase the transparency. Out of Table 1, it becomes clear that 45% of the 
sample companies used at least one of the provisions in the beginning of the six-year period, a 
number that slightly increased during the investigated time span. When the totals are divided 
over the four categories, it becomes clear that provisions for taxes are rather exceptional, 
whilst provisions for other risks and costs (for instance concerning the environment, 
reorganizations, contracts, securities …) are the most used one. 
 
 
TABLE 1: Number of companies, making use of the provisions 
 
Categories of provision Absolute use Use in % (∑= 10 418) 
“Provisions for risks and costs” 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
 
1) Pensions and similar obligations 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
 
4 681 
4 774 
4 813 
4 892 
4 981 
5 035 
 
 
1 754 
1 803 
1 866 
1 928 
 
44,9 % 
45,8 % 
46,2 % 
47,0 % 
47,8 % 
48,3 % 
 
 
16,8 % 
17,3 % 
17,9 % 
18,5 % 
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2001 
2002 
 
2) Taxes 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
 
3) Repair and maintenance costs 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
 
4) Other risks and costs 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
1 985 
2 076 
 
 
121 
126 
133 
130 
143 
124 
 
 
1 299 
1 308 
1 299 
1 260 
1 250 
1 213 
 
 
3 579 
3 712 
3 729 
3 758 
3 823 
3 873 
19,1 % 
19,9 % 
 
 
1,2 % 
1,2 % 
1,3 % 
1,2 % 
1,4 % 
1,2 % 
 
 
12,5 % 
12,6 % 
12,5 % 
12,1 % 
12,0 % 
11,6 % 
 
 
34,4 % 
35,6 % 
35,8 % 
36,1 % 
36,7 % 
37,2 % 
 
 
The question can be asked how many categories the companies use individually. In Table 2, 
the frequencies are limited for the years 1997 and 2002, since no distortions are found for the 
intermediate years. As is clear, only 0,2% of the companies are making use of all categories of 
provisions. Most companies do only use one category.  
 
 
TABLE 2: Number of companies, making use of various provisions 
 
Number of provisions Absolute use Use in % (∑ = 10 418) 
In 1997: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
In 2002: 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
5 737 
3 016 
1 274 
   375 
      16 
 
 
5 383 
3 192 
1 457 
   364 
     22 
 
55,1 % 
28,9 % 
12,2 % 
  3,6 % 
  0,2 % 
 
 
51,7 % 
30,6 % 
14,0 % 
  3,5 % 
  0,2 % 
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If we have a look at the importance of the balance sheet item, in terms of the balance total, it 
seems that for most of those companies that make use of the provisions, the provisions make 
up between 1 and 5% of the balance total. 
 
 
3. The use of provisions as tool for earnings management 
 
Now that the importance of the “Provisions for risks and costs” has been shown, the use of 
this balance sheet item as a means for income smoothing and big bath accounting can be 
examined. Hereby we base ourselves on the 10 418 companies filing an annual report 
according to the complete scheme (see above). The research methodology is based on the 
paper of Overboom and Vergoossen (1997), performing a similar research for the Dutch listed 
companies for the period 1988 to 1994. 
 
 
Income smoothing 
 
So as to examine whether Belgian companies smooth their income in the period investigated, 
being from 1997 to 2002, two patterns of income are compared. The first pattern is the 
reported (that is post managed) pattern of income, being the net income after taxes. The 
second pattern is the corrected pattern, being the reported income corrected for the mutation 
in the total provisions. The hypothesis to be tested can be stated as: 
 
The policy of provisions of the Belgian companies, filing an annual report according to the 
complete scheme, does not lead to a smoother pattern of income.  
 
The reported and the corrected income of the investigated companies are direct variables. 
When the equalization of this category of variables must be examined, it can be approached 
by means of the integrated squared difference. The differences between the mutations of the 
income numbers of successive years are squared and afterwards summed up. When the 
integrated squared second difference of the reported income numbers is smaller than the 
integrated squared second difference of the corrected income, there is an equalizing process 
coming from the mutations in the provisions. 
 
However, the focus on the income numbers implies that companies of the sample, showing a 
loss, have to be eliminated out of the sample. This leads to a final sample of 4 312 companies. 
In this group of companies, fulfilling the criterion of profit, a distinction has to be made 
concerning the relation between the reported and the corrected income pattern (see Table 3). 
 
 
TABLE 3: The relation between the reported and the corrected income pattern 
 
Income pattern Number of companies (∑= 4 312) 
The reported income pattern is more equal than the 
corrected income pattern 
 
1 639 
The reported income pattern is not more equal than the 
corrected income pattern 
 
   899 
There is no difference in income pattern 1 774 
 6 
 
 
Giving the value of one for the 1 639 companies for which the reported income pattern is 
more equal, and the value of zero for the 2 673 others, a nominal variable is constructed, for 
which a binomial test is the best choice. For the calculations of p0, the product is taken of 45% 
(being the percentage of companies using provisions, see Table 1) and 81% (so as to eliminate 
the 19% of the 4 312 companies that are only using the provisions of pensions and taxes, as 
these two categories of provisions are not suited for income smoothing). So the null 
hypothesis states that 36% of the investigated companies are smoothing their income. 
 
Given these data, the z-value obtained is 2,75. Since 2,75 is no element of the acceptance 
zone (the critical z-value is 1,645), we have to reject the null hypothesis at the significance 
level of 5%, and accept the alternative hypothesis that more than 36% of the companies are 
smoothing their income. 
 
As can be expected, performing the test by SPSS leads to similar results, since a p-value of 
0,003 is obtained (see Table 4). So here as well, the statistical assimilation of the data gives a 
clear indication that the companies investigated (being those companies showing a profit and 
using the provisions of group 2 and 4) are smoothing their income by means of their 
provisions. 
 
 
TABLE 4: The binomial test 
om 
1,00 1639 ,38 ,36 ,003 a 
,00 2673 ,62 
4312 1,00 
Group 
1 Group 
2 Total 
binomiaal 
test 
Categor
y 
N 
Observe
d Prop. Test 
Prop. 
Asymp. 
Sig. (1sided 
)tailed) 
Based on Z 
Approximation. 
a.  
 
 
 
Big bath accounting 
 
After finding evidence supportive of income smoothing, it might be interesting to examine 
whether Belgian companies take up extra provisions in their annual reports, when a decline in 
profit takes place. Companies can apply this technique, so as to make a clean sweep in the 
bookkeeping system. The hypothesis to be tested can be stated as: 
 
The policy of provisions is not used by the Belgian companies, filing an annual report 
according to the complete scheme, as a means for big bath accounting. 
 
So as to examine the relation between the evolution of profits and the use of provisions, cross 
tables need to be constructed. Hereby a distinction has to be made between those companies 
having a rise or a decline in profits on the one hand, and between those companies granting a 
donation to the provisions or not on the other hand. 
 
The focus of these distinctions makes clear that only those companies, showing a mutation in 
their income number and making use of the provisions at least once during the period 
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examined, can be integrated in the sample. This leads to a final sample of 6 356 companies 
(see Table 5). Since the income numbers of 1996 (needed for calculating the mutation in 
profit numbers for 1997) are not available, the period of investigation starts in 1998, ending in 
2002. 
 
 
TABLE 5: The cross-tables for 1998 – 2002 
 
 Income after taxes Donation to provisions ∑ 
  Yes No  
1998 Rise 1 733 1 686 3 419 
 Decline 1 451 1 486 2 937 
 ∑ 3 184 3 172 6 356 
1999 Rise 1 704 1 560 3 264 
 Decline 1 509 1 583 3 092 
 ∑ 3 213 3 143 6 356 
2000 Rise 1 647 1 627 3 274 
 Decline 1 522 1 560 3 082 
 ∑ 3 169 3 187 6 356 
2001 Rise 1 584 1 423 3 007 
 Decline 1 680 1 669 3 349 
 ∑ 3 264 3 092 6 356 
2002 Rise 1 547 1 482 3 029 
 Decline 1 706 1 621 3 327 
 ∑ 3 253 3 103 6 356 
 
 
By giving the value of one if a decline in profits is taking place and the value of zero if profit 
is rising and, analogously, by giving the value of one if a donation is observed and the value 
of zero if no donation took place, we become variables which can be situated on a nominal 
scale. So by using the chi-square test of Pearson, the null hypothesis can be tested that there is 
no significant negative relation between the change in income and the donations to the 
provisions.  
 
Performing the test by using SPSS, the results can be divided into two groups at first sight. 
For 1998, 2000 and 2002 (see Table 6), the χ2-value shows that the level of statistical 
dependence between the variables is low, whilst the p-value (being higher than the presumed 
level of significance) confirms that no significant relation between the variables exists. So the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected for these three years under investigation. 
 
 
TABLE 6: The chi-square tests for 1998, 2000 and 2002 
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1998 
1,041 b 1 ,308 
,990 1 ,320 
1,041 1 ,308 
,314 ,160 
1,040 1 ,308 
6356 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction a 
Likelihood 
Ratio Fisher's Exact Test 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Computed only for a 2x2 table a.  
0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1 465,73 b.  
 
 
2000 
,54 b 1 ,46 
,50 1 ,47 
,54 1 ,46 
,46 ,23 
,54 1 ,46 
6356 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction a 
Likelihood 
Ratio Fisher's Exact Test 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Computed only for a 2x2 table a.  
0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1 536 b.  
 
 
2002 
,027 b 1 ,871 
,019 1 ,890 
,027 1 ,871 
,880 ,445 
,027 1 ,871 
6356 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction a 
Likelihood 
Ratio Fisher's Exact Test 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Computed only for a 2x2 table a.  
0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1 478,76 b.  
 
 
For 1999 and 2001 (see Table 7), however, the χ2-value is high, and the p-value is smaller 
than 0,05. So there seems to be a significant relation between the variables. However, before 
the null hypothesis is rejected, it has to be examined whether it concerns a positive or a 
negative relation. 
 
 
TABLE 7: The chi-square tests for 1999 and 2001 
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1999 
7,354 b 1 ,007 
7,218 1 ,007 
7,355 1 ,007 
,007 ,004 
7,353 1 ,007 
6356 
Pearson Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction a 
Likelihood 
Ratio Fisher's Exact Test 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Computed only for a 2x2 table a.  
0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1 528,79 b.  
 
 
2001 
4,005 b 1 ,045 
3,905 1 ,048 
4,005 1 ,045 
,047 ,024 
4,004 1 ,045 
6356 
Pearson Chi-
Square Continuity 
Correction 
a 
Likelihood 
Ratio Fisher's Exact Test 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases 
Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided) 
Computed only for a 2x2 
table 
a.  
0 cells (,0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1 462,81 b.  
 
 
For this reason, a correlation table is to be made up for both years (see Table 8). These make 
clear that since the Pearson correlation is positive, a positive relation exists between both 
variables under study. So it can be concluded that companies are not making more donations 
when a decline in profits is observed, but on the contrary when an increase in profits takes 
place. Since this is contradictory with the assumed hypothesis, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected neither for these both years. 
 
 
TABLE 8: The correlation tables for 1999 and 2001 
 
1999 
1 ,034 ** 
. ,007 
6356 6356 
,034 ** 1 
,007 . 
6356 6356 
Pearson 
Correlation Sig. (2-
tailed) N 
Pearson 
Correlation Sig. (2-
tailed) N 
CHIPI9
9 
DOT9
9 
CHIPI9
9 
DOT9
9 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 
level (2-
**.  
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2001 
1 ,025 * 
. ,045 
6356 6356 
,025 * 1 
,045 . 
6356 6356 
Pearson 
Correlation Sig. (2-
tailed) N 
Pearson 
Correlation Sig. (2-
tailed) N 
CHIPI0
1 
DOT0
1 
CHIPI0
1 
DOT0
1 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 
leveltailed). 
*.  
 
 
 
4. Future research 
 
In this paper, it is examined whether the Belgian companies did manage their earnings by 
their policy of provisions during the period 1997 - 2002. Concerning the technique of income 
smoothing, some proof has been found that companies do smooth their income by increasing 
or decreasing the provisions. For the second technique, big bath accounting, no proof has been 
found, showing that companies do not grant more donations to provisions in times of a 
declining profit figure.  
 
As for every research, some limitations can be mentioned. What the sample is concerned, we 
only concentrate on companies filing an annual report according to the complete scheme, 
since there is no legal prescription to split up the provisions in the annual report according to 
the abbreviated scheme. Besides, only companies with a TVA-number to be observed for 
every year of the investigated time span are included. So companies started after 1997 or 
ended before 2002, restructured or merged companies and the like are skipped, although this 
group might show an interesting behavior concerning provisions. 
 
Also the results can be approached critically, since no account has been taken of the possible 
existence of natural equalization. Indeed, an equal result can be consciously brought about by 
management, however can be obtained without manipulations as well. It is impossible to 
distinguish between both kinds, and to examine which reason is prevailing. 
 
It must be realized that for this kind of research, results are very dependent on the design of 
the study. So it is not unthinkable that by using another period of examination, another 
population or another methodology, other results would be obtained. So it might be interesting 
to perform a similar study, for instance by looking at the policy of inventories, by looking at a 
particular sector or by looking at companies showing a certain profit. It also might be 
interesting to look whether the motives for listed and non-listed companies to manipulate the 
figures, differ a lot.  
 
Another possible research topic is to evaluate the various measures which have already been 
taken so as to limit the use of the possibilities of earnings management. So the consistency of 
the use of certain accounting methods, as for instance the policies of depreciation or 
revaluation, is of great importance, as well as a clear definition of items. Also the 
classification of the fair view as overriding principle and the introduction of corporate 
governance are a step in the right direction. 
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And last but not least, the use of IAS/IFRS standards will limit the creativity, for instance by 
emphasizing the substance over form principle. Also, because of the introduction of IAS 37, 
concerning provisions, some of the existing categories of provisions will have to be 
eliminated in the Belgian annual report, since they do not agree with the definition and the 
criteria of provisions, as written down in the standard. More specifically, the provisions of 
category 3 (provisions for repair and maintenance costs) and some of the other risks and costs 
booked in category 4 (like provisions for political risks, for general risks, for risks of 
exchange rates and the like) will have to be kept out in future. Clearly, management looses a 
tool for earnings management this way !! 
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